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ABSTRACT: Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential 
patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up 
problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with 
these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the 
double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and 
reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the 
complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages 
entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from 
entry and innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
High technology products such as cell phones or electronic memory devices are often based 
on technological standards that require the use of dozens or even hundreds of essential patents 
owned by different IP holders. By definition an essential patent is strictly necessary for the 
standard, either because it is legally impossible or prohibitively expensive to do without it.1 If 
a downstream firm wants to produce goods that are based on the standard it requires access to 
each of the essential patents. This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements 
effect: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of 
the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be 
inefficiently high. In addition, there is the well known vertical  double mark-up effect that 
further raises royalties. Many standard setting organisations see these problems and require 
their members to charge “reasonable and non-discriminatory”  (RAND) royalties.2 There is a 
consensus that RAND commitments prevent outright refusal to license and exclusive 
licensing, but there seem to be no additional constraints implied by RAND, in particular 
concerning royalties. As Swanson and Baumol (2005) point out: „It is widely acknowledged 
that, in fact, there are no generally agreed tests to determine whether a particular license 
does or does not satisfy a RAND commitment“. Thus, a reference to RAND hardly restricts the 
pricing policies of patent holders.  
Firms are using two different business strategies to deal with these externalities. One 
strategy is vertical integration. For example, in the mobile phone industry some firms such as 
Nokia or Sony Ericson not only own essential patents to the WCDMA standard, they also 
produce handsets on the downstream market. By vertically integrating they eliminate the 
double mark-up problem within the integrated firm (but not between firms). Another strategy 
is horizontal integration on the upstream market. This can be achieved by forming a patent 
pool that licences some (or all) essential patents as a bundle at a jointly set royalty rate. For 
example, there are two mutually exclusive patent pools on the DVD standard, both of which 
need to be licensed to produce goods that are compliant with the standard.3 Alternatively, one 
                                                 
1
 A patent is “legally essential” for a standard if the standard cannot be implemented without infringing the 
patent. It is “commercially essential” if it is prohibitively expensive to implement the standard without the 
patent, even if this is technologically feasible. See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008, p. 9).  In reality it is not 
always obvious whether a patent is essential or not. Patent holders have a strong incentive to overstate the 
importance of their IP rights. Furthermore, it is often unclear whether a patent will survive if it is challenged in 
court. For a more detailed discussion of these problems see Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Dewatripont and 
Legros (2008). In this paper we do not consider these problems and assume that it is common knowledge which 
patents are in fact essential. 
2
 In Europe, most SSOs require royalties to be “fair” in addition.  
3
 See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008, p. 7). 
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patent holder can acquire additional essential patents or pass through rights from other patent 
holders and then licence his patent in conjunction with the pass through right to use the other 
essential patents as well. This strategy has been employed by Qualcomm on markets for 
mobile phone communication.   
These different business strategies have been treated differently by anti-trust 
authorities. Vertical integration is generally considered to be beneficial because it it is seen as 
a remedy against the double mark-up problem. Horizontal integration is more controversial. 
For many decades patent pools were perceived as a collusion device. While this perception 
has changed after the U.S. Department of Justice approved the MPEG-2 patent pool in 1997 
and the two DVD patent pools shortly thereafter,4 patent holders that acquire other patents 
without practicing them are seen with increasing suspicion. Non-practicing patent-holders 
have been associated with “patent trolls” and have been denied injunctive relief and lost profit 
damages when their patents got infringed on the grounds that they did not use their patents to 
manufacture themselves.5  
In this paper we compare the two business strategies of vertical and horizontal 
integration.6 We analyze the effects of different market structures on upstream royalties, 
downstream prices, entry decisions and incentives to innovate. Our model of the downstream 
market is very general and allows for all kinds of downstream market interaction (competition 
in prices, quantities, product differentiation, advertising, etc.) as long as a weak regularity 
condition is satisfied. As a base line we consider a market structure in which upstream and 
downstream firms are non-integrated and where linear royalties have to be used upstream. 
Then we ask how the market outcome changes if some (or all) upstream firms vertically 
integrate with some downstream firms. It turns out that even though vertical integration 
partially solves the vertical double mark-up problem it may result in higher royalties and less 
production on the downstream market than non-integration. This is due to the fact that a 
vertically integrated firm has an incentive to raise its royalty rate in order to raise its rivals’ 
cost. In contrast, horizontal integration of upstream firms is always beneficial and 
unambiguously reduces the complements problem. We show that if the number of 
                                                 
4
 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have softened this stance in their joint report on 
antitrust and IP issued April 2007 (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/ipreport.shtm ). Now they acknowledge that 
including substitute patents need not be anti-competitive. Patent pools will be reviewed according to the rule of 
reason in the future. See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) and Gilbert (2002) for more on the history of patent 
pools and the shift of US policy.  
5
 See Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2009). 
6
 In our model the optimal solution is always full integration. However, in reality this is rarely achieved because 
there are too many different parties involved that often have an incentive to free ride on the integration efforts of 
the other market participants. See Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) and Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008).  
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downstream firms is sufficiently large, horizontal integration always outperforms vertical 
integration.  
We also consider the use of two-part tariffs. It is well known that two-part tariffs can 
be used to solve the double mark-up problem in a vertical relationship of two firms that both 
have market power. We show that it can also be used to solve the complements problem 
(together with the double mark-up problem) under all market structures. This is particularly 
simple if all upstream firms are horizontally integrated. If firms are non-integrated there exists 
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which all upstream firms charge two-part tariffs that 
solve the complements and the double mark-up problem. If firms are vertically integrated, 
however, this equilibrium fails to exist if there are sufficiently many firms. In this case 
efficiency can be achieved in an asymmetric equilibrium with the awkward property that one 
firm monopolizes the downstream market but makes zero profits, while all the other vertically 
integrated firms do not produce downstream but extract all the monopoly profits from the 
producing firm with their fixed fees. Thus, it seems less likely that firms manage to coordinate 
on the efficient equilibrium under vertical integration than under horizontal integration. 
Perhaps even more important than the effects of market structure on prices are the 
effects on entry and innovation. We show that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to 
discriminate against entrants on the downstream market in order to raise their rival’s cost 
which is not the case for a horizontally integrated or a non-integrated upstream firm. Then we 
consider the incentives of an upstream firm to innovate and invest in an improvement of the 
standard. This improvement may reduce downstream production costs, it may make the 
products based on the standard more valuable to consumers, or it may open the door to new 
applications. No matter what the benefits of the innovation are, the incentives to innovate are 
smaller the more firms there are on the upstream market. The reason is that the innovator 
requires access to all the other patents in the standard. The more IP holders there are, the 
smaller are the profits that can be generated with any given innovation and the more reluctant 
the incumbent IP holders are to include an additional essential patent in the standard. Thus, 
horizontal integration on the upstream market is an important instrument to stimulate 
innovation.  
We conclude that the current shift in US competition policy to permit patent pools for 
complementary patents is a move in the right direction. However, there is no reason to 
discriminate against other forms of horizontal integration such as the acquisition of patent 
rights by non-practicing patent holders. Our analysis shows that vertically integrated and non-
integrated patent holders have indeed different incentives to set their royalties, but the 
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presumption that a non-practicing patent holder will always choose higher royalties than a 
vertically integrated one is not justified. 
 
Our paper is closely related to the growing literature on patent pools and 
complementary patents. Shapiro (2001) discusses the case of patents that are perfect 
complements and argues that patent pools and cross licensing agreements can be a solution to 
the complements problem. Lerner and Tirole (2004) argue that it is often not obvious whether 
patents are complements or substitutes. They show that patent pools that are based on 
complementary patents are welfare increasing, while patents that include substitutes reduce 
competition and welfare. Furthermore, if patents are complements, patent pools will allow for 
independent licensing, while patent pools that include substitutes will not do so. This is 
confirmed empirically by Lerner, Stojwas and Tirole (2006). They propose independent 
licensing as a screening device to be used by anti-trust authorities to distinguish between 
welfare increasing and welfare reducing patent pools. Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) consider the 
free rider problem that arises in the process of the formation of a patent pool. Each upstream 
firm benefits if other firms join the pool and reduce their royalties, but it may be profitable for 
each firm to stay out. None of these papers considers the effects of vertical integration nor do 
they analyse the effects on entry and innovation. 
Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) provide an empirical investigation of the different 
sharing rules employed in modern patent pools and the factors that affect the decision of an IP 
holder to join a patent pool. They find that vertically integrated firms are more likely to join a 
pool and that IP holders with more valuable patents are less likely to join if the pool shares 
profits proportional to the number of essential patents.  
Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2006) discuss potential methods for assessing 
whether licensing terms are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND). They argue 
that patents that make a greater contribution to the value of the standard should be allowed to 
charge higher royalties. Gilbert and Katz (2007) analyze different sharing rules in patent pools 
and their impact on the incentives to develop new technology. In our model, all upstream 
firms are symmetric, so the sharing rule is trivially the equal split. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on raising rivals’ costs strategies by vertically 
integrated firms. Salop and Sheffman (1983, 1987) consider a dominant firm that can affect 
marginal and average costs of a competitive fringe. They show that the dominant firm will 
raise its rivals’ cost in order to either foreclose the market or to induce competitors to raise 
their prices and to relax competition. Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) consider a two-stage 
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duopoly model with price competition and differentiated products. In their model there is a 
foreclosure effect only if downstream firms compete in prices. Goods produced upstream are 
perfect substitutes. In our model upstream goods are perfect complements and our results hold 
for any form of downstream competition. Kim (2004) analyses a model similar to ours, but he 
only considers Cournot competition with linear demand on the downstream market and he 
does not analyze the implications for entry and innovation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a very 
general model of a vertically structured industry in which all upstream goods are perfect 
complements. Section 3 restricts attention to linear royalties and compares a market structure 
where all firms are non-integrated to market structures where some firms are vertically or 
horizontally integrated. Section 4 allows for two-part tariffs. In Section 5 we discuss the effect 
of different market structures on entry on the same or another (unrelated) downstream market. 
In Section 6 we consider the incentives of upstream firms to innovate. Section 7 concludes 
and discusses the application of the model to other industries with complementary inputs such 
as rail or electricity networks.  
 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an industry with an upstream and a downstream market. The crucial feature of the 
upstream market is that the goods offered upstream are perfect complements, all of which are 
required for downstream production. This is the case in many high technology industries with 
direct or indirect network externalities in which firms agreed to technological standards to 
make sure that their products can interoperate or that they are compatible to complementary 
products. For example, the GSM or WCDMA standards on the telecommunication market 
guarantee that different handsets can communicate with each other, and the BlueRay and HD-
DVD standards ensure that high definition video discs are compatible with DVD players 
produced by different companies. Typically, a standard requires access to a number of 
complementary patents that are often owned by different IP holders.  
On the upstream market there are m  firms, indexed by 1,...,u m . Each upstream 
firm owns one essential patent. The costs for developing patents are sunk. Upstream firms 
license their patents at non-discriminatory, linear royalties . Linear royalties are frequently 
used in many industries because of their simplicity and their risk-sharing properties (see 
ur
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Section 3). In Section 4 we also consider the case where upstream firms can charge two-part 
tariffs and show that our main qualitative arguments are unaffected.  
 
On the downstream market there are  symmetric firms, indexed by . The 
focus of the analysis is on the royalties charged on the upstream market. Therefore, we want 
to keep the downstream market as general as possible. We assume that each downstream firm 
chooses an action vector 
n 1,...,d  n
K
d dx X  {  that affects the quantities of the (possibly 
differentiated) goods that the firm itself and its competitors sell on the downstream market.7 
In the simplest interpretation each firm chooses its quantity  directly, so dq d dx q  and 
. However, downstream firms may also decide on price, advertising, marketing, 
sabotage or other business strategies.  In this case 
0dX
 {
dx  is a vector with d dx X  where dX  is a 
subset of some multi-dimensional Euclidean space. 
The production of one unit of each of the downstream goods requires full access to all 
patents. Thus, if downstream firms produce , d=1,...,n, then each upstream firm sells 
 licenses. In the basic model we assume that all fixed costs are sunk and that 
downstream firms are symmetric and all incur the same marginal production cost . In 
addition, each downstream firm has to pay linear royalties 
dq
1
n
d
d
Q q
 
 ¦
k
1
n
u
u
r
 
 r¦  for each unit of 
production. Thus, total marginal cost is 
1
n
d u
u
c k r
 
 ¦ . 
The time structure of the game is as follows: At stage 1, all upstream firms set their 
royalty rates simultaneously. At stage 2, all downstream firms observe the royalty rates and 
choose d dx X  simultaneously. The quantity sold by each firm and the total quantity are 
functions of the action profile 1( ,..., )nx x x . The following regularity assumption is needed 
to make sure that we can do comparative statics in order to compare different royalty 
structures.   
 
Assumption 1: For any vector of royalties 1( ,..., )mr r r 
f
  and any corresponding vector of 
marginal costs  1,..., nc c c f  there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium  *x rf  of 
the downstream market game at stage 2 that gives rise to quantities 
                                                 
7
 See Höffler and Kranz (2007). 
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1 * ,..., *nq x r q x rf f   with      
1
*
n
d
d
Q x r q x r
 
 ¦ *f f . If firm d’s marginal cost  
increases, its equilibrium quantity  decreases. Total equilibrium quantity Q  is continuous 
and decreasing in the marginal cost  of each firm , 
dc
dq
dc d ^ `1,...,d n .  
 
The first part of Assumption 1 requires the existence of a unique equilibrium in the 
downstream market game. If there are multiple equilibria a comparative static analysis is 
possible only with respect to the set of equilibria. Some of our results continue to hold in this 
case, but the analysis is messy and not insightful. Therefore, we restrict attention to the case 
of a unique downstream equilibrium. The second part of Assumption 1 saying that the 
equilibrium production level of each firm is a decreasing function of its own marginal cost 
and that total production decreases as well is very natural and holds quite generally. Dixit 
(1986) shows that it is satisfied in duopoly models of price and quantity competition with very 
general demand functions, and in oligopoly models with homogenous goods for both Bertrand 
and Cournot competition. 
Because we do not impose a specific model of downstream competition and do not 
postulate any specific demand functions derived from the preferences of rational consumers 
we cannot compute consumer surplus and social welfare directly. This is the price of the 
generality of our model. However, this price is small, because we can compare the market 
outcome under different market structures to the outcome that would obtain if there were no 
contracting problems and firms could solve the complements and the double mark-up problem 
perfectly, i.e. if all upstream and all downstream firms could agree on a set of royalties that 
maximize total industry profits. This is called the “full integration outcome”. It  turns out that 
in all the cases we consider the market outcome involves higher royalties and lower total 
quantities than this full integration benchmark. By definition the full integration benchmark 
maximizes industry profits. Furthermore, all standard models of oligopoly imply that if total 
quantity Q is smaller than the quantity chosen by a fully integrated monopolist, then an 
increase of Q is associated with an increase of consumer surplus. Therefore, in these cases we 
will say that an increase of Q increases social welfare. 
For simplicity we suppress the reference to the action profile *x  and use 
 and     *d dq r q x r f f     *Q r Q x r f f   in the following.  
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3. Linear Royalties under Different Market Structures 
 
In this section we characterize the royalties that obtain under different market structures. 
Upstream firms are restricted to use non-discriminatory, linear royalties. Linear royalties are 
predominantly used in practice because of their risk-sharing properties. If downstream 
demand is uncertain, a linear royalty rate shares the risk between upstream and downstream 
firms, while a fixed fee shifts all the risk to downstream firms. In fact, Layne-Farrar and 
Lerner (2008, p. 10) report that linear royalties were used by all the patent pools they 
investigated. We compare the case of non-integration, where all upstream and downstream 
firms are owned separately and set royalties and downstream prices independently, to the 
cases of vertical integration, where some (or all) upstream firms are vertically integrated with 
some downstream firms, and horizontal integration on the upstream market, where several or 
all patents are owned by one firm. An alternative interpretation of horizontal integration is a 
patent pool that jointly licenses all patents in a bundle.  
 
 
3.1 Non-integration 
 
At stage 1 each upstream firm maximizes ( , )u u u ur Q r r3  . Note that . Thus, by 
Assumption 1, Q  is a continuous function of   and depends on  only. The 
following standard assumption is required to guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium 
in the royalty setting game.  
1
m
d
u
c k r
 
 ¦ u
rur
1
n
u
u
r
 
 ¦
 
Assumption 2: The marginal revenue of upstream firm u from increasing its royalty  does 
not increase if other firms increase their royalty rates, i.e. 
ur
 
2 2
2 0
u
u
u j
Q Q
r
r r r r
w 3 w w w w w w   (1) 
 
This assumption is very natural. If firm j increases its royalty rate, total quantity on the 
downstream market is reduced (by Assumption 1). This makes it less attractive for firm u to 
raise its royalty rate which would reduce the number of licenses sold to the downstream 
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market even further.8 Assumption 2 implies the existence of a unique pure strategy 
equilibrium in the royalty setting game (see Proposition 1). Without this assumption a 
comparative static analysis would be much more difficult.  
   
Proposition 1: There exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the royalty setting game at 
stage 1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
In equilibrium each upstream firm maximizes its profits ( , )u u u ur Q r r3  . Because all firms 
are symmetric they all charge the same royalty rate  that is fully characterized by the first 
order condition 
NI
ur
 m m m0 0
0
0NIu u
u
QQ r
r r! !
w3 w    w w  (2) 
where the superscript NI stands for “Non-integration”.  
As a reference point, suppose that all upstream and all downstream firms can agree on a set of 
royalties that maximize total industry profits, but they cannot restrict the actions chosen on the 
downstream market. This is called the “full integration” outcome or benchmark. Total 
industry profits are given by 
  (3) 
1
upstream profit downstream profitsprofits of all other
of firm upstream firms 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
m
u u u j u u d u u
j u d
u j u
r Q r r r Q r r r r 
z  
z
3    3¦ ¦
'*(*) '**(**)'**(**)

                                                
Comparing the objective function (2) of a single upstream firm to total profits (3), we see that 
each upstream firm does not take into account the impact of its own royalty rate on the profits 
of all other upstream firms, nor on the profits of all downstream firms nor on consumer 
surplus.  
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium royalties are too high as compared to the royalties in the full 
integration benchmark. By increasing its royalty rate firm u exerts two negative externalities: 
x by reducing total quantity Q it reduces the profits of the other upstream firms 
(complements effect) 
 
8
 The same assumption is imposed in any Cournot game to guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. 
See Novshek (1985) and Shapiro (1989).   
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x by raising the total royalty burden it reduces the profits of the downstream firms 
(double mark-up effect) 
 
Proof: The first order conditions for the maximization of total industry profits require for all 
:  1,...,u n 
 
10
0 <0 <0
complements effect double mark-up effect
( ) ( )( ) 0
FI FI m
FI FI FI d
u v
v u du u
Q r Q rQ r r r
r r r rz  ! 
w3w ww3      w w w w¦ ¦'() '*(**) '**(**) '*(*)  
r
m
 (4) 
 
where  and the superscript “FI” stands for “Full Integration”. Note that only the 
sum of royalties matters for total industry profits, while the distribution across upstream firms 
is irrelevant. Therefore, we impose w.l.o.g. . If all upstream firms choose the 
optimal royalties under full integration total quantity is . Comparing 
1
n
FI FI
u
u
r r
 
 ¦
1 ...
FI FI
mr   
( )FIQ r (4) to (2) it is 
straightforward to see that in this case the first derivative of each firm’s profit function is 
strictly positive. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium. Each firm would have an incentive to 
increase its royalty  until (2) is satisfied. Hence, .  Q.E.D. ur NI FIu ur r!
 
The complements effect has first been observed by Cournot (1838, Chapter 9). It 
stems from the fact that the goods produced by the upstream firms are perfect complements 
that are sold by independent firms. The double mark-up effect is due to the vertical chain of 
producers that all have market power. Upstream firms have a monopoly on their patents that 
are essential inputs for downstream firms that also have market power and impose an 
additional mark-up when they sell to consumers.  
 
 
3.2 Vertical Integration 
 
Suppose now that l upstream firms and l downstream firms vertically integrate, one upstream 
firm with one downstream firm each. Thus, we now have l vertically integrated firms, m-l 
non-integrated upstream firms, and n-l non-integrated downstream firms. At the first stage the 
non-integrated upstream firms and the upstream divisions of the vertically integrated firms set 
linear royalties , . At the second stage the non-integrated downstream firms and ir 1,...,i  
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the downstream divisions of the vertically integrated firms choose action vectors dx  giving 
rise to quantities , , on the downstream market. By Assumption 1 there exists a 
unique Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game at stage 2. Furthermore, Assumption 1 implies: 
dq 1,...,d  n
 
Corollary 1: If firms charge the same royalties under non-integration and under vertical 
integration, then the total quantity produced is larger the more upstream firms are vertically 
integrated. 
 
Proof:  Under vertical integration a firm does not have to pay royalties to its own upstream 
division. Therefore, if royalties are the same, the marginal costs of each vertically integrated 
firm are lower than the cost of a non-integrated firm:  
 
1
n
NI VI
i j j
j j ì
c k r k r c
 z
i  !   ¦ ¦  (5) 
 
By Assumption 1, total equilibrium quantity  increases if the marginal cost of one firm 
decreases. Therefore, Q  increases if upstream firms vertically integrate. Q.E.D. 
Q
 
  The result suggests that vertical integration is beneficial because it raises total 
quantity. However, this need not be the case. Corollary 1 assumes that royalty rates are the 
same under non-integration and vertical integration. This could be the case if prices on the 
upstream market are regulated by the same price cap that is binding under both market 
structures. However, if firms are not constrained in their royalties they will choose different 
royalty rates under different market structures.    
  What royalties will be chosen under vertical integration? When a vertically integrated 
firm sets its royalty rate, it internalizes the effect on the profits of its own downstream 
division. Thus, vertical integration solves the double mark-up problem within each firm. 
However, there are still three negative externalities: 
1. The well known double mark-up problem across firms remains, because firm i  does 
not take into account the effect of its own royalty ir  on firm j ’s downstream profit. 
2. Furthermore, a vertically integrated firm does not internalize the effect of its royalty 
rate on the upstream profits of the other firms. Thus, vertical integration does not solve 
the complements problem.  
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3. Finally, there is a new externality that does not exist under non-integration nor under 
horizontal integration. This is the “raising one’s rivals’ costs” effect: The higher the 
royalty charged by firm i  the higher are the costs of the other firms active on the 
downstream market, while firm i ’s costs are unaffected.  This induces firm i  to raise 
its royalties in order to raise its rivals’ costs.  
Because all of these externalities are negative, royalties in a vertically integrated industry are 
too high.  
 
Proposition 3: Royalties chosen if all upstream firms are vertically integrated are larger than 
the royalties in the full integration benchmark.   
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
The more interesting question is whether vertical integration is superior to non-integration. 
Perhaps surprisingly this is not necessarily the case. Vertically integrated firms may charge 
higher royalties and induce a less efficient market outcome than non-integrated firms.  
 
At stage 1, vertically integrated firm  chooses royalty  in order to maximize the 
sum of profits in its upstream and downstream division:
v vr
9
  
         
_
_
VI VI
v v v v
upstream profit downstream profit
r Q r q r P Q r c rª º3    ¬ ¼
f f f
'*(*)
f
'****(*****)
 (6) 
  
Differentiating with respect to  the FOC for the optimal  requires:  vr vr
 
1
same as under <0 >0
non-integration internalization of raising one's rivals' costs
vertical double mark-up
1
VIVI VI n
VI VIv v
v v
jv v v
qQ P QQ r q P k r
r r Q r  
ª ºª ºw3 ww w w          « »« »w w w w¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¦'**(**) '***(***) j vrw'***(** )*  (7) 
  
The first two terms correspond to the FOC under non-integration: An increase in vr  
raises revenues per unit of output, but it reduces the quantity of output. The last two terms 
reflect the effect of an increase of vr  on downstream profits and have no analogue under non-
integration.  
                                                 
9
 Note that the royalty income from its own downstream division is a cost of the downstream division and thus 
cancels out in the profit function. However, it will be convenient to keep these two terms separate in order to 
facilitate the comparison of the first order conditions. 
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Consider the third term first: By increasing its royalty rate vr  firm v  raises the costs of 
all downstream firms which increases the market price. However, it also increases the cost of 
its own downstream division, so profits of the downstream division are reduced. Because firm 
v  internalizes this vertical double mark-up problem it has an incentive to moderate its royalty 
rate as compared to a non-integrated upstream firm.  
However, there is a forth effect that works in the opposite direction:  By raising its 
royalty rate firm v  increases the marginal costs of its downstream competitors i vz . Thus, in 
the downstream continuation equilibrium the quantities chosen by all other firms are reduced 
while the quantity of firm v  goes up, so firm v  receives the mark-up, iP c , on a larger 
quantity. Thus, the forth term gives an additional incentive to raise royalties as compared to a 
non-integrated upstream firm.  
This “raising one’s rivals’ cost effect” implies that each vertically integrated firm has 
an incentive to raise its royalty rate in order to improve its own market position to the 
detriment of its rivals. However, there is a prisoners’ dilemma. In equilibrium all vertically 
integrated firms choose the same royalty, nobody has a competitive advantage, and everybody 
would be better off if all firms could jointly reduce their royalties. 
 
Proposition 4: Vertically integrated firms may choose higher or lower royalties than non-
integrated upstream firms.  
 
In the Appendix we offer two simple examples showing that the net effect can go in both 
directions.  
Even if vertical integration yields higher royalties than non-integration it may still 
yield a more efficient market outcome because vertically integrated firms are not distorted by 
the royalties that they pay to themselves. However, in the case of a Cournot model with linear 
demand,  if the number of vertically integrated firms is not too large then vertical integration 
yields a total quantity that is smaller than the total quantity produced under non-integration.10 
In this natural example vertical integration reduces total output, total industry profits and 
social welfare.   
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See Kim (2004, p. 245). 
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3.3 Horizontal Integration  
 
We now consider the possibility that some upstream firms merge and integrate horizontally. 
The integrated firm bundles its IP rights and licenses them at a joint royalty rate on the 
downstream market.  
 
Proposition 5: As the number of upstream firms decreases, total equilibrium royalties are 
reduced and total quantity sold on the downstream market increases.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 5 shows that - in contrast to the case of vertical integration - a horizontal merger 
unambiguously reduces royalties and increases total industry profits. Furthermore, it increases 
the total quantity of production and thus improves efficiency. Hence, horizontal integration is 
always more profitable and more efficient than non-integration. However, under horizontal 
integration royalties are still higher than the royalty rate that maximizes total industry profits.  
 
Proposition 6: If all upstream firms are horizontally integrated there is no complements 
effect and no raising one’s rivals’ cost effect, but the double mark-up effect remains. 
Therefore, the royalty charged by the upstream firm is too high and downstream quantity is 
too low as compared to the royalty charged in the full integration benchmark.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The royalty rate chosen by a horizontally integrated upstream firm is larger than the royalty in 
the full integration benchmark because of the double mark-up problem. However, the more 
competition there is on the downstream market, the smaller is the mark-up. In the limit, if 
downstream competition becomes fully competitive, the double mark-up problem disappears 
and the royalty chosen by a horizontally integrated upstream firm approaches the royalty rate 
that maximizes total industry profits.  
This result suggests that if the downstream market is sufficiently competitive, horizontal 
integration outperforms vertical integration. Indeed in the example of a Cournot model with 
linear demand three downstream firms are already sufficient to render horizontal integration 
superior to vertical integration:  
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Example 2: Suppose that there is Cournot competition downstream and that the demand 
function is linear. If there are more than two firms on the downstream market, horizontal 
integration yields a higher output on the downstream market than vertical integration.  
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
4. Two-part Tariffs 
 
So far we assumed that upstream firms are restricted to use linear royalties which is the 
prevalent case in reality. However, firms could also use two-part tariffs. It is well known that 
two part-tariffs can be used to solve the double mark-up problem. If firms are horizontally 
integrated or form a patent pool it is very simple (and a dominant strategy) to implement the 
full integration outcome: set the linear royalty such that downstream firms are induced to 
charge the monopoly price and choose the fixed fee such that it extracts all downstream 
profits.  
In this section we show that if firms are not horizontally integrated they can still use 
two-part tariffs to solve the complements problem and to implement the fully integrated 
outcome. However, in contrast to the case of horizontal integration this requires coordination 
among the IP holders. We will show that this can be difficult and is more likely to happen 
when firms are non-integrated than when they are vertically integrated. 
 
Proposition 7: Suppose that all firms are non-integrated. If upstream firms are restricted to 
use non-discriminatory two-part tariffs there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in 
which upstream firms charge linear royalties that implement the full integration outcome and 
extract all profits via the fixed fees from downstream firms.  
 
Proof : Note first that in any equilibrium all downstream profits must be extracted. If this was 
not the case each upstream firm would have an incentive to further raise the fixed fee of its 
royalties. Consider now an equilibrium candidate where the royalties are sufficiently small 
that all downstream firms want to produce. Suppose that the sum of all linear royalties is 
larger (smaller) than the royalty rate that implements the full integration benchmark. In this 
case each firm has an incentive to lower (raise) its own linear royalty. This increases total 
industry profit. Hence, by raising the fixed fee of its royalty scheme at the same time, the firm 
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would be better off. Thus, the only symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which all 
downstream firms produce must have identical linear royalties for all upstream firms that sum 
up to .  Q.E.D. FIr
 
Note that if upstream firms can also use discriminatory royalties the equilibrium 
breaks down. In this case a deviating upstream firm can raise its fixed fee for 1n   
downstream firms to infinity, so that only one downstream firm survives and serves the 
downstream market as a monopolist. If the deviating upstream firm raises its fixed fee for this 
remaining downstream firm so that it extracts all the monopolist’s profits, the deviation is 
profitable. Note further that there are other symmetric pure strategy equilibria as well. For 
example, it is always an equilibrium that all upstream firms charge fixed and/or linear 
royalties that are so high that no downstream firm wants to license. 
 
Proposition 8: Suppose that all m upstream firms are vertically integrated. There exists an 
m  such if m mt  there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium 
that implements the full integration outcome. However, there always exists an asymmetric 
subgame perfect equilibrium in which one firm serves the entire downstream market at the 
monopoly price but makes zero profit. The other firms set the linear royalties equal to 0 and 
extract all the profits of the downstream  monopolist through their fixed fees.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
With vertical integration and sufficiently many upstream firms the symmetric equilibrium 
breaks down. The reason is that a vertically integrated firm de facto discriminates in favour of 
its own downstream division even if it charges all firms the same royalties. This is because the 
downstream division of a vertically integrated firm is not affected by the royalty charged by 
its own company. Thus, a vertically integrated firm could raise its fixed and/or linear royalty 
to a prohibitive level and thus exclude all other firms from the downstream market. If the 
number of VI firms is sufficiently large, so that the share of total profits accruing to each firm 
in a symmetric equilibrium is sufficiently small, such a deviation becomes profitable. In this 
case a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that implements the full integration outcome fails 
to exist which makes the coordination problem much more difficult. To be sure, there are 
asymmetric pure strategy equilibria that implement the monopoly outcome, but these 
equilibria are asymmetric and awkward: One firm monopolizes the downstream market, but 
 17
this firm makes zero profits and all the rents go to the upstream firms that are not active 
downstream. Because nobody wants to be the zero profit monopolist, it seems very difficult to 
coordinate on such an equilibrium.  
 
To summarize: Two part-tariffs can be used to increase total industry profit. This tends 
to increase social welfare because total quantity increases.  For a horizontally integrated firm 
(or a patent pool) it is a dominant strategy to set royalties that implement the full integration 
outcome. With non-integrated firms there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that 
implements this outcome, but the equilibrium is not unique. If firms are vertically integrated a 
symmetric equilibrium implementing the monopoly outcome fails to exist if the number of VI 
firms is sufficiently large. In this case there are only asymmetric equilibria with an uneven 
distribution of profits. Thus, with horizontal integration it seems more likely that a welfare 
improvement will be implemented than under non-integration which in turn outperforms 
vertical integration.  
 
5. Entry and Innovation 
 
In the previous sections we looked at a static market in which the companies and the products 
and technologies they sold were exogenously given. In this section we want to discuss some 
dynamic features of these markets. What are the incentives of potential entrants to enter the 
downstream market depending on the market structure? How is this affected by vertical and 
horizontal integration? How do vertical and horizontal integration affect the incentives to 
innovate and to come up with new technologies that complement the existing products?   
 
5.1. Entry on the Downstream Market  
 
Suppose that a potential entrant considers entering the downstream market. The entrant can 
produce a potentially differentiated good with marginal cost  and has to incur a sunk entry 
cost . Whether entry is profitable depends on how royalties and the final price on the 
downstream market will react to an additional competitor downstream. The timing is as 
follows: First, the entrant decides whether to enter the market. Then upstream firms decide on 
their linear royalties. Finally firms compete on the downstream market and profits are 
realized. 
ek
0K t
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If the entrant enters the market the increase in competition induces firms to reduce 
their mark-up which mitigates the double mark-up problem and increases the quantity of the 
final good that is sold downstream. A non-integrated patent holder always benefits from 
additional downstream competition. He has no incentive to discriminate against the entrant or 
to squeeze him out of the market. The same holds for a horizontally integrated upstream firm. 
Furthermore, horizontal integration unambiguously mitigates the complements problem, so 
total royalties are lower than under non-integration which makes entry more likely.  
For a vertically integrated patent holder the analysis is more complicated. On the one 
hand the upstream division of the vertically integrated firm benefits from the extension of the 
downstream market. On the other hand, the increased competition reduces downstream 
profits. To mitigate the increased competition the vertically integrated firm wants to raise the 
entrant’s cost by increasing its royalty rate. In fact, the “raising one’s rivals’ costs” effect may 
be so strong that the royalty rate is set prohibitively high and the entrant is shut out of the 
market.  
To illustrate this consider a simple example with differentiated products and Bertrand 
competition as analyzed by Wang and Yang (1999).11 Initially there is one vertically 
integrated firm. A potential entrant may enter the market with a differentiated product. The 
entrant extends the market and increases total welfare, but he may reduce the profits of the 
vertically integrated firm. Whether and at what rate the integrated firm licenses its patent to 
the potential entrant depends on the degree of product differentiation. If the two products are 
close substitutes the vertically integrated firm will foreclose the entrant because the negative 
effect of increased competition dominates. Entry is accomodated only if products are 
sufficiently differentiated. However, because of the raising one’s rival’s cost” effect the 
vertically integrated firm always charges a royalty that is higher than the rate charged by a 
non-integrated firm. The raising one’s rival’s cost effect disappears only when the two 
products are completely independent, i.e. when the entrant enters a different and completely 
unrelated market.  
Similarly, in the example of a linear Cournot model in which all downstream firms 
have identical marginal costs ( ), it can be shown that royalties charged by the vertically 
integrated firms are so high that no independent downstream firm can enter the market even if 
ek k 
                                                 
11
 Wang and Yang (1999, Section III) are mainly interested in comparing linear and fixed royalties. They show 
that a vertically integrated firm prefers linear royalties over fixed fees because linear royalties can be used to 
affect the marginal cost of its competitor. It is straightforward to apply their example to our analysis of vertically 
intergrated and non-integrated patent holders. I am grateful to Gerard Llobet for pointing out this example to me.   
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the entry cost is 0.12 A necessary condition for entry is that the entrant has an efficiency 
advantage over existing firms ( ). In this case the vertically integrated firms face a trade-
off. On the one hand, the low cost competitor reduces their downstream market shares and 
profits. On the other hand, the low cost competitor lowers the downstream price and thereby 
extends the downstream market, which benefits their upstream profits. Comparing a vertically 
integrated to a non-integrated or horizontally integrated upstream firm, the latter benefit from 
the extension of the downstream market but do not suffer a reduction of downstream profits. 
Thus, a vertically integrated firm always charges higher royalties to an entrant than a non- or 
horizontally integrated firm which makes entry less likely. 
ek k
 
5.2  Innovation on the Upstream Market 
 
What are the implications of different market structures on the incentives to innovate and to 
come up with new technologies on the upstream market? Suppose that a company has an idea 
for an innovation that improves the quality of the technology. This may be an additional 
feature that makes it possible to use the technology for new applications, to reduce the cost to 
employ the technology in downstream production or to raise the benefits of consumers from 
using the downstream product. Innovation can be interpreted as entry on the upstream market. 
However, while the entrant on the downstream market produces a substitute to the products of 
the other downstream firms, the entrant on the upstream market produces a complement to the 
other upstream goods.  
To develop the innovation and to protect it by a patent the innovator has to incur an 
investment cost . The innovation can be used only if the existing upstream firms include 
it in the standard. The innovation raises consumers’ willingness to pay and/or lowers 
production costs. This raises the profits that can be made on upstream and downstream 
markets. By how much profits increase depends on the market structure. The analysis of the 
preceding sections suggests that if linear royalties have to be used additional profits will be 
higher under horizontal integration than under non-integration. It will also be higher under 
horizontal integration than under vertical integration if the number of downstream producers 
is sufficiently large. In this section we do not model explicitly how different market structures 
affect the profits that can be derived from the innovation. Instead we assume that if the 
innovative patent is owned by a horizontally integrated firm the profits of this firm will 
increase from 3  to . If however, there are m  independent upstream firms initially, 
0I !
(1)3'
                                                 
12
 See Kim (2004, Theorem 1). 
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and if the number of independent upstream firms increases to 1m   because the innovation is 
included in the standard then total upstream profits change from  to 
. By Propositions 5 and 6 we know that total royalties are increasing with 
 and that for all  total royalties are higher than the royalty a monopolist would choose.  
Therefore we must have  and 
( )m3
( 1) ( 1m m3  '  )
m 1m t
( ) ( 1)m m3 !3  ( ) ( 1)m m' ! '  .  
 
Suppose first that one of the existing upstream firms comes up with the idea for the 
innovation. If it innovates total profits on the upstream market increase by , ( )m' ( )m
m
'
 of 
which accrues to the innovator. Thus, we get:  
 
Proposition 9: An existing upstream firm will innovate if and only if ( )mI
m
'd . The smaller 
the number m of upstream firms, the larger is ( )m
m
'
 and the larger are the incentives to 
innovate.  
 
Suppose now that the potential innovator is a new company that does not own any 
other patents that are essential to the standard. Furthermore, the company has to develop the 
innovation and to incur the (sunk) investment cost I  before negotiating on the terms of 
including the innovation in the standard.   
If the standard is controlled by a horizontally integrated company the analysis is 
straightforward. If   the two parties will agree that the horizontally integrated firm buys 
the innovation and includes it in the standard. Assuming Nash bargaining they will split the 
surplus equally, so the innovator receives 
0' !
2
'
. Thus, the investment in the innovation will be 
undertaken if and only if  
2
I ' . 
 Consider now the case with  independent upstream firms. It does not matter 
whether these firms are vertically integrated or not. In principle, there are two ways how the 
innovation can be included in the standard. First, the innovator could join the standard as an 
independent firm, so the number of upstream firms increases to 
1m !
1m  . Second, one of the 
upstream firms could acquire the patent from the innovator. 
Suppose that the innovator joins the standard and becomes an additional independent 
firm on the upstream market. For this he needs the consent of all  upstream firms. Without m
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the innovator each upstream firm’s profit is ( )m
m
3
. With the innovator the profit of each firm 
on the upstream market is ( 1) ( 1
1
m m
m
3   ' 

)
. Thus, the innovation will be included in the 
standard if and only if  
 
m 0
0
( )( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1)mm m m m
m !!
03'  ! '  3 3  !'**(**)  (8) 
  
Thus, the additional profit generated by the innovation if there are 1m   upstream firms must 
be larger than the average profit of each firm without the innovation ( )m
m
3§¨
© ¹
·¸
 plus the 
reduction in total profits that is due to having one additional firm (and thus one additional 
complements problem) on the upstream market   ( ) ( 1)m m3 3  . If the innovation is 
included in the standard, the innovator gets 1
1m   of total profits. Thus, the innovation is 
profitable if and only if  ( 1) ( 1( )
1
m mI I m
m
3   '   
)
.  
If these conditions are not satisfied, the innovation could still be included in the 
standard if one of upstream firms acquires the patent. If it does so, the innovation raises total 
profits from  to . Thus, the profit of the firm that acquired the patent 
increases by 
( )m3 ( ) ( )m m3 '
( )m P
m
'  , where P  is the price to be paid to the innovator. Assuming Nash 
bargaining, ( )
2
mP
m
'  . Thus, the investment will be undertaken only if 
( )
2
mI
m
'  . Note, 
however, that this is an asymmetric equilibrium and that the profits of all other firms increase 
by ( )m
m
'
 because they benefit from the innovation without having to pay for it. Thus, there is 
a free rider problem where each firm prefers the other firms to acquire the patent. It turns out 
that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with a positive probability of innovation. A 
symmetric equilibrium would have to be a mixed strategy equilibrium where each firm 
acquires the patent with positive probability. However, in a mixed strategy equilibrium each 
firm has to be indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring. Thus, the surplus to be shared 
with the innovator is zero. But if the price for the innovation is zero, the innovation will not 
be undertaken.  
These results are summarized in the following proposition: 
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Proposition 10: Suppose that an independent innovator can develop an innovation at cost I .  
a) If a horizontally integrated firm controls the upstream market, any innovation that is 
value increasing is included in the standard. The innovation will be undertaken iff 
2
I ' . 
b) If m  firms are active on the upstream market the innovation will be included in the 
standard and the innovator will become firm 1m   on the upstream market if the 
value of the innovation is sufficiently large and the investment cost is sufficiently 
small, i.e. if 
m
0
( )
0
( 1) ( ) ( ) (mm m m m
m !!
1) 03'  ! '  3 3'**(*  !*)  and 
( 1) ( 1)
1

. As m of , ( ) m mI I m
m
3   '   ( )m'  and ( )I m  go to 0. 
c) If m  firms are active on the upstream market and these conditions are not satisfied 
there also exists an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where one of the upstream 
firms buys any innovation that is value increasing at price ( )
2
mP
m
'  . In this case the 
innovation is developed iff ( )
2
mI
m
'd  .  
Thus, we find that innovation becomes more likely the fewer firms there are on the upstream 
market. The incentives to innovate are maximized if all firms on the upstream market are 
horizontally integrated or, equivalently, if all upstream firms form a patent pool.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
If different IP holders own complementary patents that are all essential to a standard, several 
externalities arise that affect their pricing decisions. In a general model of downstream 
competition we have shown that horizontal integration has positive effects on total output and 
tends to increase social welfare, while the effects of vertical integration are ambiguous or 
negative. Horizontal integration eliminates the complements effect and induces lower prices 
and higher quantities on the downstream market. Furthermore, a horizontally integrated firm 
benefits from downstream market entry and encourages innovation upstream. Vertical 
integration, on the other hand, solves the double-mark-up problem between the two merging 
firms, but it gives rise to a raising one’s rivals’ cost effect. The net effect may increase prices 
and reduce output and social welfare. Furthermore, vertically integrated firms compete against 
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new market entrants and want to discriminate against them. Finally, vertical integration does 
not affect the problem that an innovator needs permission by all upstream IP holders to join 
the standard, so it does not encourage innovation. These results suggest that the current shift 
in US competition policy to permit patent pools for complementary patents is beneficial. It 
also suggests that companies that buy patents in order to bundle them or to pass them through 
as a bundle to donwstream firms perform an important welfare increasing function and should 
not be generally associated with patent trolls. On the other hand, our analysis shows that 
vertical integration can have ambiguous effect and should be seen with more caution, in 
particular when entry and innovation are of crucial importance for the development of the 
market.  
Our model also applies to industries that require access to a physical network such as 
electricity, railways or fixed-line telecommunications, if the network consists of separate parts 
that complement each other. For example, there are often regional monopolies that own 
separate parts of the electricity grid, of the railway lines or of the telecommunications 
infrastructure. If a downstream firms wants to offer services that are based on the network it 
often need access to the entire network. In this case the different parts of the network are 
perfect complements and the results of this paper apply.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Assumption 2 implies that the profit function of each upstream firm is 
globally concave in ,   ur
2 2
2 2 0u u
u
Q Q Q Q Q
r r
r r r r r r
w 3 w w w w w     w w w w w w
2
2  
Thus, by the well known existence proof for concave games (Debreu, 1952), a pure strategy 
equilibrium exists. In equilibrium the FOCs  
 0u u
u
QQ r
r r
w3 w   w w  (9) 
must be satisfied. Suppose that there are two equilibria with corresponding royalty vectors  
 and . Let 1( ,..., )A mr r A r1( ,..., )B Bmr r
1
m
A A
u
u
r
 
 ¦  and 
1
m
B
u
u
r
 
 Br¦ , and suppose wlog that . 
This implies that . Comparing the FOCs for  in the two equilibria we have 
. Summing up over all u this implies  . However, 
Assumption 2 implies 
A B
r r!
( ) ( )AQ r Q r B ur
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2 0
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a contradiction. Thus, . Symmetry implies Ar r 1 ...A Amr    and . Thus, 
equilibrium royalties are unique.  Q.E.D. 
...
B
mr   Br
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: A vertically integrated firm , v ^ `1,...,v l  chooses its royalty rate to 
maximize         
_
_
V VI VI
v v v v
upstream profit downstream profit
r Q r q r P Q r c rª º3    ¬ ¼
f f f
'*(*) '****(*****)
f
. The FOC for this maximization 
problem is 
 
1
same as under <0 >0
non-integration internalization of raising one's rivals' costs
vertical double mark-up
1
V VIVI VI n
VI VIv v
v v
jv v v
qQ P QQ r q P k r
r r Q r  
ª ºª ºw3 ww w w          « »« »w w w w¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¦'**(**) '***(***) j vrw'***(* )**  (10) 
A non-integrated upstream firm u , ^ `1,...,u l m  , chooses its royalty rate to maximize 
. Its FOC is given by ( , )U VIu u u ur Q r r3  
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U VI
VIu
u
u u
QQ
r r
w3 w
r  w w  (11) 
 
The first order condition for the maximization of total industry profits can be rewritten as:  
 
10
0 <0double margin effect on firm 
double margin effect
on other firms
( )( ) 1 0
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(12) 
Suppose all firms on the upstream market choose the optimal royalties under full integration  
, so total downstream quantity is . Then we have  FIur ( )FIQ r
1
<0<0
double margin effectcomplements effect
on other dowstream firms
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Thus, the derivative of each firm’s profit function at  is strictly positive, so each firm has 
an incentive to further increase its royalty rate.  Q.E.D. 
FB
r
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: We give two examples to show that the effect can go in both 
directions. Suppose that  , i.e. all firms are vertically integrated, all firms are symmetric 
and compete in quantities downstream. If the demand function is linear, it is easy to compute 
that  
m n 
 2
( ) ( 3)
4 1 1
VI NI
u u
a k n a k
r r
n n n
    !    . 
Thus, with linear demand firms charge higher royalties when they are vertically integrated 
than when they are not integrated. 
If the demand function is given by 
1
P Q K
  (constant price elasticity of demand equal to 
0K  ) and if nK !  it can be shown that  
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so royalties charged by vertically integrated firms are smaller than under non-integration.13 
  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: In equilibrium, the first order condition 0u u
u
QQ r
r r
w3 w    w w  has to 
hold for all upstream firms . Consider two upstream markets with  and  firms 
respectively, . Summing up (1.4) over all firms we get 
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 ¦ ^ `1,2i . Substracting the second equation from the first we have 
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1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 0m Q r m Q r   d  
However, because 2m m1  this implies  which implies , a contradiction. 
Thus, we must have . Note that  implies that all downstream firms have lower  
costs with  than with  upstream firms, so downstream prices are lower and the quantity 
sold on the downstream market is higher if the number of upstream firms decreases.  Q.E.D. 
2( ) ( )Q r Q r! 1 1
2 2
2
r r
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r r! 1r r!
2m 1m
 
Proof of Proposition 6: A horizontally chooses its royalty rate to maximize   H HIr Q r3  . 
The FOC for this maximization problem is 
                                                 
13
 If nK d  firms want to raise royalties to infinity, so an equilibrium does not exist. 
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H HI
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The first order condition for the maximization of total industry profits can be rewritten as:  
 
1
same as under non-integration <0
internalize double margin effect
on downstream firms
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Suppose the horizontally integrated upstream firm chooses the optimal royalty rate under full 
integration  , so total downstream quantity is . Then we have FIr ( )FIQ r
as:  
 
1
0
( )( ) 0
FIH n
FI FI d
d
Q rQ r r
r r r  

w3ww3 w3    w w w ¦'*(*)r !w  (15) 
Hence, the horizontally integrated firm will choose a royalty that is larger than  and total 
quantity on the downstream market will be lower.  Q.E.D. 
FI
r
 
 
Example 2: If all upstream firms are horizontally integrated, total quantity is given by 
(( )
2 ( 1)
HI n a cQ n
b n
 
)
. On the other hand, if all m upstream firms are vertically integrated they 
will set royalties that exclude all independent downstream firms from the market. In this case 
total quantity is given by 2 ( )( ( 3) ( 1))
VI m a cQ
b m m m
    . Note that 
HIQ  is strictly increasing in n 
while  is strictly decreasing in m. For n=3 total quantity is higher under HI than total 
quantity under VI for m=2.  Q.E.D. 
VIQ
 
Proof of Proposition 8: Note first that in any pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium all 
downstream profits must be extracted via the fixed fees. Thus all downstream firms (or 
downstream divisions of vertically integrated firms) are just indifferent whether or not to 
produce downstream. Consider an equilibrium candidate where all vertically integrated 
choose identical linear royalties the sum of which induces the full integration outcome on the 
downstream market and identical fixed fees the sum of which extracts all profits of the 
downstream firms/divisions. Let ( )Mp k  denote the price chosen by a fully integrated 
monopolist with marginal cost  and let  denote his monopoly profit on the 
downstream market. If the symmetric linear royalties  implement the monopoly price 
k ( )M k3
r
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downstream, it must be the case that ( 1 . Note that each firm makes a profit 
of 
) (Mn r k p k    )
1 ( )M k
m
3  in the candidate equilibrium.  
Consider now the following deviation of firm 1. It raises its fixed fee to infinity, so that no 
other firm can afford to license its patent. Thus, firm 1 becomes a monopolist on the 
downstream market. It has to pay fixed fees to the other firms that are equal to its downstream 
profit if it had not deviated. Note that this is bounded above by 1 ( )M k
m
3 . On the other hand, 
it now monopolizes the downstream market, so it will make at least the profit of a monopolist 
with marginal cost of . These profits are bounded below by the profits of 
a monopolist with marginal cost 
( 1) (Mn r k p k    )
( )Mp k  (note that  ( )Mp k  is independent of ). Denote the 
profit of a monopolist on the downstream market with marginal cost  
n
( )Mp k  as  
 ( ) 0M Mp k3  3 ! . 
Hence, a deviation is profitable if 1 1 2(k)> (k)     (k) M M M
m m m
3  3 3  3 ! 3 . Note that 
for all k ,  2 ( )M k
m
3  goes to zero as  goes to infinity. Thus, there exists an  m m  such that for 
all m mt  the deviation is profitable. Thus, if m mt  there does not exist a symmetric pure 
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium that implements the monopoly outcome.  
 
Consider now asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. Suppose that only one firm serves the 
downstream market. In equilibrium this firm must make zero profits. Otherwise the other 
firms would have an incentive to raise the fixed fees of their royalties. With a monopolist 
downstream profits are maximized if all upstream firms charge linear royalties of zero and 
fixed fees equal to the monopoly profit divided by n-1.  Given these royalties, no firm has an 
incentive to deviate, so this is indeed a subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium the monopolist serving the downstream market makes zero profits, while all the 
other firms share the monopoly profit.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 9: By Proposition 5 we know that total royalties increase as the number 
of independent upstream suppliers increases. Thus, total royalties are larger under non-
integration or vertical integration than under horizontal integration while  is smaller. 
The probability that entry occurs is 
( )e r3
( ( ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( ( )E E )Eprob r K prob r K G r3 t   3 t   3 . 
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The cdf  is strictly increaing, whilie  is strictly decreasing. Hence, the probability 
of entry is higher under horizontal integration.  Q.E.D. 
 G  ( )e r3
 
 
Proof of Proposition 10: Consider an upstream market with  non-integrated firms. To 
simplify notation denote . So  is the probability of entry given 
the total fixed fee . Thus, each upstream firm maximizes . In equilibrium, 
the first order condition  
m
0( ) ( (0) )H F G F 3  ( )H F
F ( )NIu uF H F3  
1 1
' 0
NI m m
NI NI NIu
v u v
v vu
H F F H F
F   
w3 § · § ·  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸w © ¹ © ¹¦ ¦  
m
 
has to hold for all upstream firms 1,...,u  . Assumption 3 is equivalent to the assumption 
that 
2
2
( ) ( ) 0   u
H F H FF
F F
w w  w w uF Fd
2
 which implies that the second order condition is 
globally satisfied, so (x) characterizes a unique pure strategy equilibrium. Consider two 
upstream markets with  and  firms respectively, . Summing up (x) over all 
firms we get 
1m 2m 1m m!
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
( ) '( ) 0
( ) '( ) 0
m H F F H F
m H F F H F
    
     
where , 
1
m
i i
u
u
F F
 
 ¦ ^ `1,2i . Substracting the second equation from the first we have 
1 1
1 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0H F H FF H F F H F F F
F F
w w        w w  
Suppose that . Assumption 3 implies   2F Ft 1
> @
2
2
1
1
2 2 1 1[ '( ) ''( )] '( ) '( ) '( ) 0
F
F
F
F
H F F H F dF F H F F H F F H F      d³  
Thus, we must have 
 
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 0m H F m H F   d  
However, because  this implies  which implies , a 
contradiction. Thus, we must have . Q.E.D. 
2m m 1 1 12( ) ( )H F H F! 2F F
1 2F F!
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